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SUMMARY 
The use of quantitative risk assessment, in all phases of an offshore oil and gas project in Norway, has 
clear requirements in NORSOK Z-013. The purpose of QRA is to describe the risk picture and give 
decision support through all project phases. These decisions are not only related to choosing 
between two or more alternative designs in concept selection phase and detail engineering. 
Important decisions with regards to safe design, barrier management, safe operations and 
organization, use information from the QRA. 
In an early concept selection phase of a project, very limited site specific data is available and 
calculations must be done based on a set of assumptions and generalizations. Expert knowledge, 
historical and generic data is used. 
Some generic data can be solid in an early phase project, such as meteorological data, ship traffic and 
information about earthquake rates, while other generic data like gas and oil spill rates may not even 
be representable for the new installation. Generic data reflects a wide variation in types, sizes and 
age of installations. The data also represents a wide geographical area, something that can have a 
significant impact as oil production is moved closer to the Arctic environment. The development and 
use of more and more subsea production facilities creates a larger difference between new and old 
installations. 
Creating a risk picture based on generic data can have epistemic uncertainties that can be reduced. A 
QRA should focus on describing these uncertainties and the evolving process should focus on 
uncertainty reduction. Reducing epistemic uncertainties means increasing the strength of 
knowledge. 
Classifying uncertainties by their strength of knowledge and the degree of sensitivity will give the risk 
assessor a tool to manage the risk better through the project phases. It will be clearer to the assessor 
and risk manager which knowledge that needs strengthening to reduce uncertainties according to 
the wanted effect, and help make better decisions to reduce risk. Assessing the strength of 
knowledge and sensitivity will identify the robustness of the QRA and can introduce a more effective 
way of reviewing and updating the risk picture as more knowledge is available. 
In this thesis we perform a review of the available literature on such a new risk perspective, focusing 
on uncertainties and how it will apply to performing a QRA. The thesis will also show how this affects 
the complete project process from concept selection to operation and how a new risk perspective 
applies to the purpose and requirements stated in NORSOK Z013 for QRA. Through a case study 
where the new risk perspective is applied, we will show how the new risk perspective give the 
assessors the tools to better manage risk through all phases of a project from concept selection to 
operations and adds to the life cycle value of a project. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1  Background 
QRA is an abbreviation for quantitative risk assessment. Sometimes the abbreviation is used for 
quantitative risk analysis. The difference between analysis and assessment is that an assessment 
includes an analysis as well as an evaluation of the result. (Vinnem, 2014) 
PSA (Petroleum Safety Authority) states that “The NORSOK standards are developed by the 
Norwegian petroleum industry to ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness for 
petroleum industry developments and operations.” (PSA, 2010, p. 5) By this we must also 
acknowledge that a QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment), as depicted in NORSOK Z013, is not only to 
comply with the requirements of having done one and confirming that we are under the acceptable 
risk limits. 
Risk managers are required to do something to reduce the risk to ALARP (As Low As Reasonable 
Practicable) and no operating oil company in Norway will accept just monitoring the activity and be 
happy the expected results of the QRA were below acceptance limits if a person dies. Actually most, 
if not all, oil and gas operating companies, and by extensions their contractors, in Norway have a 
vision of zero injuries and harm to personnel, facilities and environment. As examples AS Norske 
Shell calls it “Goal Zero” (Shell Global, 2015), ConocoPhillips Norway calls it the “Zero Philosophy” 
(ConocoPhillips Norway, 2015). 
By introducing the “zero” philosophy the operators aspire to a vision to always try and reduce risk to 
the lowest possible extend. 
 
1.2  Goal 
The goal of the thesis is to show how a new risk perspective, focusing on and communicating 
uncertainties, will be better suited for input to managing risk through all phases of oil- and gas 
project on NCS (Norwegian Continental Shelf).  
 
1.3 Limitations 
This thesis will look at the theories behind the new risk perspective focusing on uncertainties. These 
theories can be applied to all risk assessments but in this thesis we will look at it in an offshore risk 
assessment process on NCS where QRA is used to describe the risk picture.  
A QRA offers quantitative results for many different scenarios but this thesis will use process leaks as 
scenario. The theory can be applied to all forms of scenarios, irrespective if the assessment results 
are quantitative or qualitative, as the uncertainties can be handled and communicated separately. 
Master’s Thesis 
Communication of uncertainties and robustness in quantitative risk assessment 
 
 
Page 6 of 50 
 
 
The thesis focuses on the regulations for QRA on NCS as described by NORSOK Z013. The 
international standards for offshore facilities and national standards for onshore facilities are not 
included.  
Risk treatment is not a part of NORSOK Z013 and there are many factors, outside the scope of this 
thesis, that comes into account for the decision maker in risk treatment and those will not be 
covered here. 
We will not cover the emergency preparedness assessment in NORSOK Z013, but as the standard 
acknowledges (PSA, 2010), the input and results of one process can be used as input to the other. 
  
1.4  Content 
The content of this thesis is divided into chapters covering the theory, regulations and a case study, 
followed by discussion and conclusions. 
Chapter 2 will review some of the available theory on uncertainties that is applicable to a QRA. The 
goal is to inform the reader of the difference between traditional probability view of risk and a new 
risk perspective where the uncertainty is the focus. (Flage & Aven, 2009) Different aspects of 
uncertainties are presented to make the reader understand what we are uncertain about.  
Chapter 3 reviews the context where a QRA is used and how the regulations from PSA through 
NORSOK Z013 reflects this context. This context is necessary to understand, in order to understand 
how the new risk perspective, focusing on uncertainties rather than focusing on probabilities, is a 
better tool.  
Chapter 4 will provide a practical example of how the new risk perspective with the theoretical 
details, as explained in chapter two, can improve the QRA process and better fulfill the intentions 
and requirements as described in chapter 3. 
 
1.5 Abbreviations 
 
AIR   Average Individual Risk 
ALARP  As Low as Reasonable Practicable 
ESD  Emergency Shut-Down 
FAR  Fatal Accident Rate 
FPPY  fatalities per platform year 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
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LQ  Living Quarter 
MOB  Man over board 
NCS  Norwegian Continental Shelf 
PFD  Probability of Failure on Demand 
PLL  Potential Loss of Lives 
PS  Performance Standard 
QRA  Quantitative Risk Assessment 
RAC  Risk Acceptance Criteria 
RIF  Risk Influencing Factor 
RM  risk metrics 
RNNP  Risk level in the petroleum activity 
SCE  Safety Critical Element 
SoK  Strength of Knowledge 
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2 Risk description and a new risk perspective 
2.1 A new risk perspective 
Traditionally risk has been defined, as it still does by NORSOK Z013, as the “combination of the 
probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm”. (PSA, 2010, p. 13) This definition 
we can denote: 
𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑃)  
Where 𝑅 is risk, 𝐶 is the consequence and 𝑃 is the probability of that happening. 
Most people can relate to this and has at some point encountered this definition. This definition is 
very practical when working with numbers. As an example an investment analyst can calculate the 
probability of a value 𝑋 going up or down in a certain time, based on this he can calculate predictions 
of potential winnings or loss and do an informed decision, backed by his calculations, about doing an 
investment or not, and if he does the investment, he can use these predictions to calculate how 
much he is going to invest, again based on his calculations and risk appetite. Of course, the better 
knowledge, the investment analyst has about the phenomena that affect the value 𝑋, the better, or 
in other words, the more precise his calculated estimates can be. 
Risk defined by frequency probability, is a good tool for the investment analyst because to him the 
values, such as interest rates and stock value is viewed as stochastic variables. In investments, this 
risk is defined as volatility, and estimating the volatility is based on historical data. He can observe a 
quantity of them in order to analyze them and he has little influence on them, he can just make 
predictions and decisions. It would be very fortunate for him, and very unfortunate for everyone else 
if he could influence the values, hence we have laws to prevent such things. When a decision is 
made, he can, only monitor the actual values to make a new prediction and/or decision to sell or 
invest more. A very good investment analyst also makes mistakes and unforeseen events can render 
his predictions false and he does bad investments from time to time. What separates a good 
investment analyst from a bad one is the relation between number of good and bad investments and 
their accumulated values. This way his success is based on similar operations that is repeated many 
times and this is in conformance with the frequentist view of risk. An investor can make hundreds or 
maybe thousands of such investments per year. The newest computerized investment robots makes 
millions of such micro investments and is solely based on predefined logic and the historical data as 
input, and they make lots of money even if some of those investments represents losses. It is the 
share volume that makes the difference. 
In an offshore project, frequentist view of risk is used through models to predict the probability for 
an event to occur and their consequences. An offshore risk analyst can subjectively or by frequency 
make a probability of an event 𝐴, say a gas leak occurs, based on historical data for similar 
operations. Then, based on his knowledge 𝐾, calculate the consequence 𝐶. Based on this information 
the risk manager can measure if the calculated risk is within his RAC (Risk Acceptance Criteria). This 
can again help him to decide whether to go ahead with the operation or not or compare two 
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different operations. But here is where the benefit of this as a tool stops for the offshore risk analyst 
and the offshore risk manager, because the offshore risk analyst and manager are required to 
identify the RIFs (Risk Influencing Factor) and reduce them to ALARP. Therefore it is necessary for the 
offshore risk analyst and manager to view risk in a different perspective that gives more sense when 
trying to do something about the value. PSA acknowledges this and states that (PSA, 2015a)“…this 
approach to defining risk is too narrow and limiting for the ability to understand, administer and 
manage activities and enterprises.” 
A new risk perspective, as presented by Terje Aven (Aven, A unified framework for risk and 
vulnerability analysis covering both safety and security, 2007), offers such a tool for offshore risk 
assessments and focuses on uncertainties rather than probability as the definition of risk. Aven’s 
definition of risk can be shown as; 
𝑅 = (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝑈) 
Where 𝐴 is an event or condition, 𝐶 is consequence and 𝑈 is uncertainties. The events 𝐴 is a part of 
the consequences 𝐶, and then we can simplify and denote risk as 
𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑈) 
Where 𝑅 is still risk, 𝐶 is consequences including 𝐴, and 𝑈 is the associated uncertainties. In a QRA 
the events 𝐴 studied are unwanted events. 
PSA have updated their definition of risk to “the consequences of the activities, with associated 
uncertainty”. (PSA, 2015b) The term consequences are used as a collected term for all types of 
consequences the activities can produce, not limited to potential harm to people, environment or 
assets, but also includes the unwanted events 𝐴, and conditions that can potentially lead to such. 
Taking this into account, that events A is part of consequences 𝐶, we see that PSA new definition of 
risk is according to (Aven, A unified framework for risk and vulnerability analysis covering both safety 
and security, 2007) where risk is denoted as 𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑈). 
PSA also defines the associated uncertainties as the uncertainties regarding what the consequences 
will be. This is related to both uncertainties about which events can occur and what can be their 
potential consequences. In notation we see that we have uncertainties 
𝑈(𝐴) and 𝑈(𝐶) 
Probability is just one tool to measure such uncertainties and this can serve as a way to weigh one 
solution against another. Other tools to measure uncertainties are also available. 
 
2.2  Risk description 
A risk perspective is a wholesome view of the entire concept and describes how we choose to view 
risk. The risk definition is a representation of what are the main components of that view. The 
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corresponding risk description as presented by (Aven, The risk concept-historical and recent 
development trends, 2012) can be denoted: 
(𝐴′, 𝐶′, 𝑄, 𝐾) 
Where 𝐴′ is the specified events, 𝐶′ is the specified consequences, 𝑄 is a measure of the 
uncertainties, as mentioned probability 𝑃 is just one tool, and 𝐾 is the background knowledge that 
𝐴′, 𝐶′ and 𝑄 is based on. If we regard 𝐴 as part of 𝐶 as in 𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑈), the corresponding risk 
description will be; 
(𝐶′, 𝑄, 𝐾) 
PSA defines the risk as related to the activities (PSA, 2015b), these include all the processes regarding 
technical, operational or organizational changes and that this includes the background knowledge of 
such processes. This confirms that PSA is in accord with the risk description as denoted by (𝐶′, 𝑄, 𝐾). 
The uncertainties can then be written; 
𝑈(𝐴|𝐾)  
Where we mean the uncertainties concerning the events that can occur, given our background 
knowledge 𝐾, and; 
𝑈(𝐶|𝐾) 
Which are the uncertainties about the potential consequences of those events, given our background 
knowledge 𝐾. This way we see that the uncertainties depend on how strong or weak the knowledge 
is. 
 
2.3  Risk presentation 
In a QRA the results are calculated and represented quantitatively in the form of RM (risk metrics) 
such as presented by Vinnem (Vinnem, 2014). 
 PLL (Potential Loss of Lives), also called fatalities per platform year, FPPY, and may be 
considered as the fatality risk of the entire platform. 
 FAR (Fatal Accident Rate) value implies the number of fatalities in 100 million man hours. 
 AIR (Average Individual Risk) value is the average number of fatalities per exposed individual. 
There is a mathematical connection between these values, for further description, see (Vinnem, 
2014). 
These RM are then used to compare two different solutions or to decide if the RM is below the RAC. 
𝑅𝑀 < 𝑅𝐴𝐶 
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But only presenting these metrics does not present the whole risk picture and the RM presents 
different information about the risk picture. The risk picture should also include 𝐾 according to the 
new risk perspective. 
If we go back to the investor and say that he has still not adopted the new risk perspective. He has 
clients that want to invest their savings and he presents the prospect of 𝑋 based on his calculations. 
All calculations support a positive return on the investments and the clients agrees based on the 
information they are receiving. However, since he is not including his background knowledge about 
the investment, underlying uncertainties stays hidden. By adopting the new risk perspective he 
would have to present his knowledge about 𝑋 so that the clients can make a better informed 
decision. 
 
2.4 Aleatory and Epistemic uncertainties 
We have seen that we are not uncertain about our predictions given our background knowledge K, 
but the factors that are used to arrive to the actual result. So to define the uncertainties and assess 
them we need to understand what these uncertainties are. 
This thesis will focus on two types of uncertainties, aleatory and epistemic.  Epistemic uncertainties 
relate to the knowledge about the factor and can be reduced. (Helton & Burmaster, 1996) As 
referred to in (Flage & Aven, 2009). The aleatory uncertainties are also called random or stochastic 
and thus have the attribute that they are random, we cannot control them just observe them. So for 
an investor who decides to make an investment based on his calculated predictions and can only 
monitor the factors to make a new decision, for him the factors are aleatory. If he could control them 
it would most likely be illegal. But maybe he sees a new turn of events and gain new knowledge 
about the factors he monitors so he can make a better calculation in his model, then he has 
strengthen his knowledge K and thus reduced the epistemic uncertainties. 
We mentioned the zero vision, were the oil and gas operators in Norway acknowledges that all risk 
can be reduced. So to reduce risk, and if risk is viewed through the new risk perspective where 
𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑈), we must reduce the consequence and the uncertainties, where 𝑈 is the epistemic 
uncertainties as the aleatory uncertainties cannot be reduced. We can in many ways reduce 𝐶, but 
that is very different from reducing 𝑈 because 𝐶 will always be in the theoretical future and contain 
randomness that cannot necessarily be reduced. For example we cannot predict the actual number 
of personnel in a certain area when a fire or explosion occurs because we cannot say exactly when, if 
it happens. 
As risk is not the mathematical product of 𝐶 and 𝑈, reducing 𝑈 does not necessarily means reducing 
the actual risk. But, as we will see in this thesis, in order to efficiently reduce risk, the epistemic 
uncertainties must be reduced first. Reducing uncertainty 𝑈 means strengthening our knowledge 𝐾 
about the factors that influence the risk. 
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2.5  Subjective and frequentist probability 
Probability can be expressed as a subjective probability P with references to a standard (Aven, 
Misconceptions of risk, 2010) or as a frequentist probability 𝑃𝑓.   
A subjective probability expresses that the degree of belief for a positive return is equal to pulling a 
red ball out of an urn where there are red and white balls. In probability the opposite of subjective is 
not objective, but frequentist.  
A frequentist probability 𝑃𝑓 means the fraction of times an event will occur, given the situation is 
repeated a theoretical infinite number of times under equal conditions. This includes that a 
hypothetical large population must be introduced to make an estimate 𝑃𝑓
∗. 
Let’s say that we are interested in throwing a six in a game with a die, knowing there are six mutual 
exclusive possibilities of the die, from 1 to 6 the probability of getting a six is 
𝑃𝑓(6) =  
1
6⁄  
if we assume the die to be fair. It is true that this probability is objective, but its estimate  𝑃𝑓
∗ is not. 
Say that we throw the die 60 times, then we expect to get a six, ten times, but the actual result can 
be zero or 60. This is due to natural variation and not uncertainties.  
If we have the recorded data of, say 600 die throws, and count the actual number of times the six 
appeared, we can make an estimate 𝑃𝑓
∗. If we count the number of times the six appeared to be 80, 
then 
𝑃𝑓(6) ≠ 𝑃𝑓
∗(6) Because 𝑃𝑓(6) =  
1
6⁄   and 𝑃𝑓
∗(6) = 80 600⁄ =
2
15⁄  
A frequency interpreted estimate 𝑃𝑓
∗ does not express uncertainties but natural variation. For 𝑃𝑓
∗ to 
come close to or equal of 𝑃𝑓, we would need to theoretically repeat the throw of the dice an infinite 
number of times. 
Let’s say that a leak scenario is assessed as the event 𝐴′. To produce a probability of the event to 
occur, we base our estimate 𝑃𝑓
∗ on number of recorded leaks that have occurred in the past. For this 
estimate to hold “true” or as they in many cases are presented as objective, we have to make the 
assumptions that all recorded leaks have happened under the same conditions as our scenario. This 
implies that the reasons for the leaks are arbitrary in the same manner as throwing a die. If this is the 
case, then the risk managers would just have to accept this risk and nothing could be done to reduce 
it. Thus the past would be representative for the future given a large enough sample. With leaks, this 
is not the case, and great efforts are put into reducing the possibilities of a leak to zero as in the 
companies zero philosophies. There will always be risk of a leak, but reducing it to ALARP is always a 
goal. 
However such an estimate 𝑃𝑓
∗ can serve as decision support when comparing two mutual excluding 
scenarios to decide which is the safest, then their estimated outcome will be based on the same 
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assumptions. Of course there would be more criteria that affect the decision of the decision maker, 
such as cost, schedule and risk to other than people, but we will not cover that further in this thesis. 
We can easily say that in real life, a hydrocarbon leak cannot be reproduced under the exact same 
conditions an infinite number of times, thus there exist no true objective 𝑃𝑓, and therefore the 
opposite of subjective is not objective but frequentist in statistics. 
 
2.6  Model uncertainty 
A system is what we are doing a risk assessment of, for example a process system, a social system, a 
road system or an activity can also be regarded as system with risk influencing factors. We cannot 
calculate a system, but we can create a model 𝐺(𝑋) of the system in interest to find out something 
about a true value 𝑍 that will be realized in the future. (Aven & Zio, 2013) Model uncertainty is our 
knowledge, or lack of, how well the model reflects the “real world”. 
Aven and Zio (Aven & Zio, 2013) defines the difference between the model output 𝐺(𝑋) and the true 
value 𝑍 as the model error 𝐷𝐺(𝑋). 
𝐷𝐺(𝑋) = 𝐺(𝑋) − 𝑍 
Model output uncertainty is our lack of knowledge, the epistemic uncertainty, about this error. There 
are two origins to model output uncertainty, that is the model input uncertainty and the structural 
model uncertainty. For practical reasons when performing uncertainty assessment in QRA, this thesis 
will differ between the two. 
 
2.6.1 Structural model uncertainty 
The structural model uncertainty is our lack of knowledge on the model output due to the structure 
of the model, how it’s built, simplifications, assumptions and such. It implies regarding the model 
input X as the true value, i.e. we can ignore the model input uncertainty. Model structure uncertainty 
is the epistemic uncertainty about 𝐷𝐺(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒). 
In QRA, the values of interest will be realized in the future and experimental data to accurately 
estimate its “true” value will not be available. We define the model structure uncertainty as; 
𝑈(𝐷𝐺(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒)|𝐾) 
In practical cases, it might not be a goal to have no model error, simplifications and assumptions may 
be introduced and agreed upon, having consensus between experts, to adapt the complexity and 
recourses to achieve the objective. When this is done knowingly, we can still have very small model 
uncertainty with an accepted level of model error. 
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2.6.2 Model input uncertainty 
The model input uncertainty is our uncertainty about the input values used. The inputs to a model 
are variables and parameters. 
A variable is defined by Oxford dictionary as “Not consistent or having a fixed pattern, liable to 
change”. (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015a) A variable is a factor we expect to change and use as input to 
our calculations where we can give the variable an upper and lower limit as the output will depend 
on the input, with a variable input we expect a variable output.  The uncertainties with regards to the 
variables are regarding our knowledge about what will be the correct value. 
There is another type of variable, but one that we cannot control, that also affects the outcome, that 
is a parameter. A parameter can have variation or be a constant, but since we cannot control it, we 
want to separate it from the other variables. A parameter is defined by Oxford dictionary as “A 
Numerical or other measurable factor forming a set that defines a system or sets the conditions of its 
operation.” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015b) 
The difference between a variable and a parameter is that we can exercise control on our variables, 
according to the change in parameters. Since the parameters can also have variation, some might say 
they are two of the same, but the practical distinction comes clear if you use energy or recourses to 
hold a (controllable) variable constant while waiting for the correct (uncontrollable) parameter to 
set, instead of controlling your variable to the actual parameter. 
In our model we define an input variable 𝑋, we will extend the input to include an input parameter λ. 
Our uncertainties regarding these is we can denote 
𝑈(𝐷𝐺(𝑋)|𝐾) and 𝑈(𝐷𝐺( λ)|𝐾) 
If a parameter is a constant, say the gravity, we cannot control it and it will not change. This way we 
have no parameter uncertainty about it, as long as we actually know the value and have not made an 
assumption about what we think it is. We can also know, about a variable 𝑋, say that it will be 
between 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑋𝑚𝑎𝑥, this knowledge might be strong but still we will not know exactly which 
value that will be true in the real life. For modelling, assumptions must be made about the variable. 
For example in a leak scenario, the leak size and consequence is determined by a set of variables and 
parameters. The leak rate, not meaning how often a leak occurs but how many kilograms per second 
that is released, determines the cloud size will change over time until it stops, it’s a variable. We can 
exercise control on this leak rate by safeguarding the system with a pressure release system, flaring 
or segmentation of pipes, reducing the supplied volume to the leak. What we cannot control is the 
hole size where the leak occurs, or the weather conditions when it occurs. These inputs must be set 
as parameters to the modelling scenario. Both the weather conditions and the hole size can also 
vary, but stays constant through the hole model iteration and doesn’t change over time. For 
modeling with different hole sizes or weather condition, more iterations have to be performed with 
new values as parameters. 
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2.7  Assumptions, presumptions and presuppositions 
Assumptions, presumptions and presuppositions made about variables, parameters and models, 
represents the uncertainty U because the assumptions and presuppositions are there to replace a 
factual knowledge. If we know something exactly, like the gravity constant, we don't have to make 
assumptions and presuppositions. We can choose to simplify our model by saying the gravity is 
9.8 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑡𝑜𝑛 instead of 9.82 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑡𝑜𝑛. We then assume this to be good enough, but our knowledge 
can still be strong and by doing this knowingly, we don't necessarily introduce more uncertainty even 
though we will have a difference in model input and real life, thus introducing a model error. 
An assumption is defined by Oxford dictionary as something that is stated as true or certain without 
evidence. (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015c) Therefore with more knowledge, or evidence, it becomes less 
of an assumption and less uncertain. 
A presumption is the same as an assumption but is taken for true on the basis of probability. A 
presupposition is different from an assumption in the way that is represents a condition without 
being stated. To presuppose something is to define a precondition of possibility. 
For practical reasons they should be treated the same when assessing uncertainties in a QRA. In 
many cases these terms are used for the same thing although they have different definitions. Since a 
presupposition is not necessarily stated, more experience may be necessary to deduct this 
information from a QRA. 
As an example, in a QRA, the event gas leak is investigated. A presumption is made about the 
deterioration of the pipelines based on historical data of similar equipment as the cause for leaks. 
This is a presumption as it is regarded as true on the basis on frequency probability. The frequency 
probability is assumed to be representative. At the same time, without stating it, the QRA also makes 
the presupposition that the equipment will be operated correctly at all times, since it is not taking 
into account operational failures, but this is not necessarily stated in the text. 
 
2.8  Uncertainty Assessment 
When we have chosen to regard uncertainties and not probabilities as the main component of risk, 
we will need to assess the uncertainties so that we can convey this information in a structured and 
transparent manner. To present the results in a transparent manner does not mean that the results 
become objective, but that the assessor(s) should convey the information about their limitations, or 
strength of knowledge, in the assessment in such a way that the decision takers can take this 
information into account. To make it clear for the recipient of the QRA what we are uncertain about 
and how things can be improved, we need to classify our uncertainties. 
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2.8.1 Classifying uncertainties 
We have already classified some of uncertainties with regards to what we are uncertain about. We 
have uncertainties about the identified events;  
𝑈(𝐴|𝐾) 
We have uncertainties about the consequences;  
𝑈(𝐶|𝐾) 
In the risk perspective 𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑈), we have defined that 𝐴 is a part of 𝐶, so our top uncertainty will 
be 𝑈(𝐶|𝐾).  
When using a model to calculate the risk, we defined the uncertainty about the output due to model 
structure;  
𝑈(𝐺|𝐾)  
Uncertainty about the inputs to the model due to the variables;  
𝑈(𝑋|𝐾)  
Uncertainty about the inputs to the model due to the parameters; 
𝑈(𝜆|𝐾) 
The model will be a representation of the unwanted event, such as a gas leak, and show what 
consequences this can have. 
Such an event is not random as a probability would maybe suggest, but happens due to technical, 
operational and organizational factors that occur during operations. In a QRA we are also interested 
in these factors that can prevent the event for happening and those that can mitigate the potential 
outcome. As this is a natural part of risk assessment, and we are going to regard the uncertainties as 
the main component of risk, we should also have uncertainties for these factors as they are different 
than model inputs, model and outputs. 
To do this we will take basis in an event causal chain that is used in barrier management. These are 
often represented by a bow-tie, as shown in Figure 1, to show how the barriers work to prevent 
threats to become an unwanted event. These are often called preventive or causation barriers 
(Vinnem, 2014). It also shows how the potential outcomes are affected by the consequence reducing 
or mitigating barriers. 
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Figure 1: Bow Tie diagram 
Our knowledge about the hazards, causation barriers, the initiating event, mitigating barriers and 
consequences should be separated when communicating uncertainties. The hazards and initiating 
event is what we know about the event 𝐴 and the consequences is part of our knowledge regarding 
𝐶.  
As we have chosen to define 𝐴 as a part of 𝐶, the threats, events and consequence are all included in  
𝑈(𝐶|𝐾) 
Our model with variables and parameters represent the scenario when a threat has caused an 
initiating event I and gives us the consequence C as output. In this modeling we have to make 
assumptions about the state of the barriers, as well as the assumptions made about the model, 
variables and parameters, to be able to say something about the probability of an event to occur 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐾) and the outcome as part of the risk picture. For this risk picture to be “true”, the assumed 
state of the barriers must also be true therefore we need to define and assess the uncertainties with 
regards to these. For causation barriers and mitigating barriers we write; 
𝑈(𝐵𝑐|𝐾) and 𝑈(𝐵𝑚|𝐾) 
Flage and Aven (Flage & Aven, 2009) covers this to show how the risk description in QRA can be 
done. We will also use the notation of uncertainties regarding the outcomes as (Flage & Aven, 2009) 
shows, where Z is physical quantities  such as a fire, heat load and gas dispersion, and L is the losses 
in terms of lives, environmental impact or assets. The uncertainties regarding these outcomes we 
write respectively; 
𝑈(𝑍|𝐾) and 𝑈(𝐿|𝐾) 
The information contained in a QRA is closely related to the later process of barrier management and 
barrier management is the process that actively reduces risk to ALARP. 
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The next figure, Figure 2, shows the relationship between the different uncertainties that we have 
classified. The reason we do this is because these uncertainties have different effect on the risk and 
that information should be presented to the other processes that will use this information. 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between uncertainties 
As an example we see that for risk reducing measures, we must do something about the barriers, 
changing our model does not reduce risk. To obtain a more precise result, we cannot change the 
barriers but we must do something about our model. 
 
2.8.2 Strength of Knowledge 
We have defined the different uncertainties and see that they all are depending on our background 
knowledge 𝐾. The knowledge is then the main dimension to consider first when assessing the 
uncertainties in a QRA.  By the definition of epistemic uncertainties, the stronger the knowledge is, 
the smaller the uncertainty. To assess the SoK (strength of the knowledge), we are going to 
concentrate on a crude grading as presented by (Flage & Aven, 2009) and (Aven, Practical 
implications of the new risk perspectives, 2013) . 
To make a crude grading SoK we will evaluate the following conditions: 
The knowledge is weak if one or more of these conditions are true: 
 The assumption(s) made represents strong simplification 
 Data are not available, or are unreliable 
 There is lack of agreement/consensus among experts 
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 The phenomena involved are not well understood; models are non-existent or 
known/believed to give poor predictions. 
However, if all of the following conditions are true, the knowledge is considered strong: 
 The assumption(s) made are seen as very reasonable 
 Much reliable data are available 
 There is broad agreement/consensus among experts 
 The phenomena involved are well understood; the models used are known to give 
predictions of the required accuracy. 
Cases in between are classified as having a medium strength of knowledge. 
Let’s say that a new oil reservoir is found profitable on the NCS and decision to move forward with 
concept selection for a production platform is taken. The risk assessment team is put together to do 
a QRA in the concept selection phase. Meteorological data is gathered and used as the background 
knowledge 𝐾. Each parameter and variable can individually have significance on the risk picture. It is 
therefore necessary to regard each of them as an assumption itself and assess the strength of 
knowledge for each one. 
We are going to look at the wind direction in this example. The expected wind direction is shown in a 
wind rose. The assumption is defined as: “The expected wind direction at any random time is given 
by the direction distribution presented by the wind rose”.  
The phenomena, or event, this is going to be studied for in this case is the platform layout. The wind 
direction is important for the overall design of the platform with regards to where the LQ (Living 
Quarter) should be, and where the process and drilling area should be. This is because in a case of a 
hydrocarbon leak in the process and/or drilling area, it is safer to have the LQ upwind so that the 
hydrocarbon leak is not transmitted to where most people will be. This is the reason why all 
platforms on NCS have the LQ in the south/west-west direction and the process flare, which is a 
potential ignition source, in the opposite direction. 
To assess the SoK we use the criteria presented by Flage and Aven (Flage & Aven, 2009). 
 The wind rose is a reasonable representation of the expected wind direction over the 
lifetime of the platform. 
 Much reliable data is available. Meteorological data has been systematically collected over a 
period of many years and purchased from a reliable source. 
 There is a broad consensus among experts. 
 The phenomena are well understood and the wind rose is considered to be a prediction with 
the required accuracy with regards to the platform layout. 
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All the following conditions in (Aven, Practical implications of the new risk perspectives, 2013) are 
true and we have a strong knowledge about wind direction and how it affects the layout of the 
platform. 
 
2.8.3 Sensitivity 
We can have uncertainty about a risk influencing factor such as a variable or a parameter. But having 
uncertainty doesn't necessarily mean that it affects the risk. As mentioned before, reducing 
uncertainty doesn't necessarily mean to reduce risk. This is due to sensitivity. If a system in our 
model is not sensitive to changes in a variable, we can still have little uncertainty in the result. We 
grade the sensitivity as presented by (Flage & Aven, 2009). 
 Minor sensitivity – Unrealistically large changes in base case values needed to bring about 
altered conditions. 
 Moderate sensitivity – Relatively large changes in base case values needed to bring about 
altered conditions. 
 Significant sensitivity – Relatively small changes in base case values results in altered 
conditions. 
If the wind direction is regarded as a part of the overall weather conditions, then the sensitivity 
analysis would be of the weather as a whole, the importance of one parameter can be hidden and be 
a critical uncertainty. In this case we are not uncertain about the possible directions, or their average 
frequencies, but the uncertainty is that we cannot know exactly what wind direction that will be at 
the moment a leak occurs because we cannot control weather and thus the direction will be random. 
The use of wind direction when assessing SoK was in the example in 2.8.2, for deciding the direction 
of the platform. The wind physics can change, but as an average it will not change quickly but rather 
gradually with small increments over a long time period as climate changes. Since the platform is 
going to be situated on the location for, say 40 years, the 30 year average is a good representation of 
what directions to be expected and unrealistically large changes is needed to bring about altered 
conditions, thus the sensitivity is minor. 
The average wind direction gives you an average result over a long time period, however if the wind 
direction is at the least favorable direction at a leak time, the resulting potential harm to people can 
vary drastically from the most favorable direction.  
To know how sensitive the risk is to the least favorable wind direction, another analyses using the 
least favorable direction as an input parameter could be necessary. Without this extra analysis, i.e. 
obtaining a stronger knowledge, we should not conclude that the sensitivity is low as we do not 
know exactly. We can also say that it can be difficult to decide the sensitivity with a weak knowledge, 
and SoK should have priority over sensitivity when assessing the uncertainty. If a parameter is used 
for different scenarios, i.e. different model, the sensitivity must be determined in each case. 
Master’s Thesis 
Communication of uncertainties and robustness in quantitative risk assessment 
 
 
Page 21 of 50 
 
 
In cases we have weak knowledge about, say a phenomena represented by a model 𝐺(𝑋), we have a 
weak knowledge about how the factor propagates through real world compared to the model. It will 
be difficult to decide what a small or large change is in base case value that will bring about altered 
conditions. As our knowledge is stronger about the model and how it represents the real world, we 
will be able to predict more accurately what is a small and large change and what will result in an 
altered condition or not.  
 
Figure 3: Sensitivity and model uncertainty 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the two sample inputs of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 on the model gives two sample 
outputs 𝑍1 and 𝑍2. The red dots illustrate a weak knowledge of the model compared to the 
phenomena, where we only know the place of the two dots. The blue dotted line shows us we have a 
moderate knowledge about how X behaves in G and can make a more precise decision. The green 
line shows we have strong knowledge and we see that with weak knowledge the results can be the 
same with a theoretical infinite number of possible functions. How strong knowledge is required will 
depend upon the phenomena the model represents. 
 
2.8.4 Belief in Deviation 
It requires us to have good knowledge about the model to say something about the sensitivity. In 
that sense we then assume to know what the input will be. That might not always be the case as we 
might have a deviation from what we expect. How much we believe, based on our subjective 
knowledge, the value will deviate from its base case, we define as belief in deviation as described in 
(Berner & Flage, 2014).  
As an example if we have a variable input 𝑋 to a model 𝐺(𝑋). To get a result out, we have to assign a 
value  𝑥0 to 𝑋. This assigned value can be based on an assumption about 𝑋. Our belief in deviation 
expresses how much we think the actual value 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 will deviate from the base case model input 𝑥0 
to which the model output is based on. In a leak scenario such a variable can be the gas pressure 
inside the pipe set to 𝑥0. If a process is very stable and has no known causes for upset for example 
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downstream a compressor running at fixed speed, then our belief in deviation is very low. However if 
the gas pressure is due to other variable processes known to fluctuate, we will have a medium or 
high belief in deviation. Again we see that belief, that suggests a subjective knowledge, requires us to 
know something about the variable in question to make a qualified assumption about its value. 
Otherwise, this will be based on other assumptions that again can be a root for more uncertainty. As 
mentioned previously, every variable and parameter must be regarded as separate assumptions.  
 
2.8.5 Three dimensions 
We have presented the strength of knowledge, sensitivity and belief in deviation. Together these 
three form a three dimensional characterization of uncertainty as presented by (Berner & Flage, 
2014) where they are grouped in different settings according to Table 1 
Table 1: Settings faced when making assumptions in a risk assessment. 
Belief in deviation 
from assumption 
Sensitivity of risk 
index wrt to 
assumption 
Strength of 
Knowledge 
  
  Strong Moderate 
/ Weak 
Low Low Setting 1 Setting 2 
  Moderate / High Setting 3 Setting 4 
Moderate / High Low Setting 3 Setting 4 
  Moderate / High Setting 5 Setting 6 
 
Based on the resulted settings, Berner and Flage (Berner & Flage, 2014) suggest different treatment 
responses by quantitative or semi-quantitative methods. The semi quantitative ways described by 
(Aven, Practical implications of the new risk perspectives, 2013) is basically covered by the means to 
find a setting according to (Berner & Flage, 2014). This include crude strength of knowledge and 
sensitivity categorization according to (Flage & Aven, 2009) 
Aven (Aven, 2013) also introduces the assumption deviation risk as a semi-quantitative way where 
the following are considered: 
 Magnitude of the deviation 
 Probability of this magnitude to occur 
 The effect of the change on the consequences. 
If we regard the probability of the magnitude to occur as a subjective, knowledge based, probability, 
then these three considerations also covers the three dimensions in (Berner & Flage, 2014), strength 
of knowledge, belief in deviation and the sensitivity. The assumption deviation risk is another way of 
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describing the uncertainty and involves a more calculated approach of representation. This can be 
more useful in some cases rather than just classifying the uncertainty in a different setting. 
2.9  Robustness 
How robust the results in a QRA are, depends on how sensitive the results are to changes in the base 
case. If large changes in base case are required to change the risk picture, the results in a QRA can be 
regarded as robust. If however, small changes in base case values will result in a change of risk 
picture, the results of the QRA are not robust. We see that this coheres with the sensitivity definition 
described by (Flage & Aven, 2009). We have also seen that the sensitivity also depends on the 
knowledge, and the same does the belief in deviation. If each the uncertainties in a QRA are given a 
setting 1 to 6 according to (Berner & Flage, 2014), it will cover the three dimensions of uncertainties. 
Counting the number of uncertain assumptions for each setting it would be possible to quantify the 
robustness of a QRA.  
Say a QRA is performed in an early phase of a project and then updated during the middle and late 
phases as more knowledge is available. In this case we counted the total number of uncertainties to 
1000. Out of those 1000 the following distribution between settings are found for each phase as 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Total count of uncertainties in QRA distributed by assessed setting 
Setting Early Ph. Mid Ph. Late Ph. 
1 100 125 225 
2 100 200 250 
3 200 250 250 
4 250 250 225 
5 250 125 50 
6 100 50 0 
 
It is natural that in an early phase there are more uncertainties of a high setting. As the project 
evolves with more information, the knowledge becomes stronger and the uncertainties should 
ideally be reduced. Another thing to notice is that the most important uncertainties, that should be 
given priority, are the ones with the highest settings.  
If we look at these distributions in a line chart, as shown in Figure 4, the picture will become clearer 
and show that a progress is made in the robustness. 
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Figure 4: Total count of uncertainties in QRA distributed by assessed setting 
This quantification of robustness does not only show the status of the QRA, but it also shows where 
the organization can prioritize their resources in order to increase the robustness. In the example we 
see that not much changes in the count of assumptions with setting 1 from early to middle phase of a 
project. On the other hand, we see that the assumptions with setting 6 are reduced to zero from 
early phase to late phase, as it ideally would be.  
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3 The use of QRA in offshore projects 
3.1 The purpose of QRA 
It is not the purpose of a QRA to reduce risk. The purpose is to assess the risk. The risk reduction is 
part of the risk treatment done by the risk managers. The NORSOK Z013 standard defines the role a 
risk assessment in general shall have in an offshore project according to ISO/IEC 31000. (PSA, 2010) 
The defined elements of a risk assessment are 
 risk identification 
 risk analysis 
 risk evaluation 
ISO/IEC 31000 and NORSOK Z013 standard also emphasize the importance of communication, 
consultation, monitoring and reviewing the risk through the whole process. As shown in Figure 5, 
communication and consultation is a dynamic process through all stages of a risk assessment, and all 
stages of a risk assessment are done through all stages of a project. This statement strengthens the 
need for the risk analyst to convey the information in a way that is suited for their intended purpose. 
The NORSOK Z013 standard does not cover risk treatment. However the risk assessment process can 
be used to identify potential risk reducing measures and the evaluation of these. 
The direct purpose of a QRA is stated by PSA as “to establish requirements for effective planning and 
execution of risk and/or emergency preparedness assessment”. (PSA, 2010, p. 5) But all NORSOK 
standards as a whole, including Z013, have the goal of adding value, reducing cost and increase 
safety. Having these goals in mind, the risk analyst must consider what the information in the QRA is 
going to be used for. The standard also emphasizes that the requirements in NORSOK Z013 standard 
are related to ensuring that such an assessment/analysis are suited for their intended purposes 
rather than specific requirements on how such is performed. 
NORSOK Z013 standard does not reflect the PSA new risk perspective as described in chapter two. 
The definition of risk in Z013 is “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the 
severity of that harm.” (PSA, 2010, p. 13) But since the new risk perspective does not exclude 
probability, but rather takes a more wholesome view of risk, many of the clauses and sub-clauses still 
support viewing risk as a combination of consequences and the related uncertainties. 
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Figure 5: Risk assessment process (Source: NORSOK Z013 Edition 3 2010) 
 
3.2 Project phases and QRA 
NORSOK Z013 standard divides the requirements for a risk assessment in to general requirements 
(Clause 5) that is applicable throughout the project, and more specific, additional, requirements 
according to which phase the project is in. NORSOK divides the additional requirements into the 
following phases (PSA, 2010, p. 5) 
 Concept selection (Clause 6) 
 Concept definition and optimization (Clause 7) 
 Detail engineering (Clause 7) 
 Operating (Clause 8) phases. 
The two first phases is part of project planning and detail engineering is part of project execution as 
shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Project phases as defined by NORSOK (Source: NORSOK Z013 Edition 3 2010) 
Normally, each of these phases transition from one to the next with decision milestones, also often 
referred to as decision gates. When a decision is made and the plan for execution for the next phase 
has started, it can be extremely costly to go back and redo the work due to wrong decisions. To make 
the optimal decisions, the information and the communication of it, has to be optimal. 
In an early phase, such as in concept selection, the engineering and the QRA is based on limited data 
and many assumptions to compensate for the lack of information. This is a natural and necessary 
part of this phase and should be treated as such. NORSOK Z013 standard (PSA, 2010) acknowledges 
this and states in clause 5.2 that when establishing the context of a risk assessment process, the 
objective shall be tailored to the required and available level of detail. Furthermore, it can be difficult 
to define the system boundaries when the boundaries itself must be based on a set of assumptions 
as the detail design knowledge is not available. 
As the project move into detail engineering, the concept is decided and the detail knowledge about 
the actual design is produced. The knowledge is getting stronger, and the uncertainties in a QRA 
should be reduced accordingly. The system subjected to the assessment shall be suited for its 
purpose, particularly with respect to decision input at the right time. When more detailed decisions 
are being made, more detailed (stronger) knowledge is required. 
When defining the methods, models and tools to be used, the availability of relevant and/or required 
data and models shall be considered. To use the new risk perspective focusing on communicating 
uncertainties as a tool can serve the purpose better, especially in an early phase of a project when 
uncertainties are higher and detail knowledge is not yet available. The tool can then focus on 
reducing the right uncertainties, and only when new data or knowledge is available, find the need to 
update the frequency calculations as necessary. It will also be more transparent when documenting 
uncertainties as stated in NORSOK Z013 standard (PSA, 2010) when alternative approaches are used 
to compensate for lack of relevant data and models and the limitations in the validity. 
When entering and being in an operational phase, uncertainties should ideally be reduced to zero as 
we have actual operating conditions to record and thus the knowledge should be strong. 
By communicating uncertainties rather than probability, we now have a tool to follow this natural 
progress more continuously and resources can be more efficiently used. 
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3.3 General requirements to risk assessment 
The main general requirements for a risk assessment process in clause 5.1 (PSA, 2010, p. 18) states 
that it shall always: 
 
3.3.1 “Identify hazardous situations and the potential accidental events”  
There can be cases that does not get identified and not subjected to the rest of the process.  In other 
cases there will not be possibility to perform a QRA covering the complete array of possibilities and a 
qualitative selection has to be made about which scenarios that will represent the risk pictures. This 
is done on the basis of the knowledge of experts.  
NORSOK Z013 standard states in clause 5.3 (PSA, 2010) that one of the objectives in hazard 
identification is identification of possible risk reducing measures. With weak knowledge, this can be 
very hard, especially when deciding on which risk reducing measures to choose from a variety. With 
weak knowledge the effect can be difficult to decide and then it is difficult to efficiently use the 
recourses available. Maybe lots of recourses are put into a few measures, chosen from best available 
knowledge, but as detail design goes on, maybe a less expensive and less resource demanding 
measure would be found.  
Say the team has the possible risk reducing measures 1, 2 and 3 to choose from. With weak 
knowledge they might not know which one will give the best result. This can lead to the following 
scenarios; 
 All are implemented to be as safe as possible with the cost and resources that requires. 
 One or two of them are seemed best, based on weak knowledge, and due to limitations in 
recourses the 3rd one is left out. This can prove to be wrong when more knowledge is 
available.  
In both cases recourses are stretched and cannot efficiently focus on the best possible measure with 
regards to both safety and resources. Reducing uncertainties does not necessarily mean reducing risk 
but before risk reducing measures can be done efficiently, the uncertainties must be reduced first. 
 
3.3.2 “Identify initiating events and describe their potential causes”  
The initiating events and causes are the hazards that make up the left side inputs of the bow tie 
diagram. There can be many causes that lead to the same initiating event I. Failure to identify a cause 
or an event leads to the event not being subjected to the rest of the QRA process. The more detailed 
requirements for analyzing the initiating events and their causes is more detailed in NORSOK Z013 
standard clause 5.4 (PSA, 2010) for general requirements. Additional requirements in concept 
selection phase are found in clause 6.4 (PSA, 2010, p. 31)  where it’s stated that “extra focus shall be 
on unconventional concepts” With unconventional concepts it can be more difficult to do an analysis 
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as less operational data is available. In other words the knowledge is weaker and the need to focus 
and communicate uncertainties rather than probabilities can be stronger.  
In concept definition and detail engineering, NORSOK Z013 standard (PSA, 2010, p. 34) says that the 
data shall also be based on “best available site specific information”. This underlines the need to 
update the QRA with available information and update the knowledge of the assumptions made in 
previous phase. 
In operational phase, clause 8.4 (PSA, 2010) have additional requirement to update the QRA with 
data that are considered statistically significant. If uncertainties are put into a setting in previous 
project phases, it will be more transparent which data that are more important and updating the 
data will be easier and maybe less recourse demanding in later phases. Clause 8.4 also focuses on 
updating the QRA with regards to barrier data.  
 
3.3.3 “Analyze accidental sequences and their possible consequences”  
 Accidental sequences are what can happen after the initial event and is represented by the right side 
of the bow-tie. The accidental sequence leads to the defined consequences 𝐶’. The more detailed 
requirements for this analysis found in clause 7.5 (PSA, 2010). The sub clauses are detailed to specific 
scenarios and we will not cover all of them in detail here. However it is worth to notice that the level 
of detail that is required reflects the level of details that should be covered by a proper analysis of 
the uncertainties in previous phases of a project 
In the operational phase, NORSOK Z013 standard (PSA, 2010) says that the analysis shall reflect the 
need for information by personnel involved in the operations. If uncertainties are properly classified 
with regards to the end user, this information will be easier to identify and convey to the end users. 
 
3.3.4 “Identify and assess risk reducing measures” 
To reduce risk, the measures are often introduced in the forms of barriers. Risk reducing measures 
can also be in the form of more robust design and gives requirements to the design process. 
Uncertainties about design details and barriers must be communicated to the right users.  This is not 
necessarily only the decision makers. By communicating these details better to the users, the users 
are also better enabled to give feedback to the assessors about necessary changes to base case that 
can occur during the project. 
 
3.3.5 “Provide a nuanced and overall picture of the risk, presented in a way suitable for 
the various target groups/users and their specific need and use” 
Since NORSOK Z013 standard was last revised, PSA have acknowledged that focusing on probabilities 
is a limiting way of viewing risk (PSA, 2015a). To provide a nuanced risk picture, the new risk 
perspective focusing on uncertainties should be used. This sub clause also underlines the 
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requirement to communicate the uncertainties based on who is going to use the information and 
who needs to be informed about the uncertainties. This relates not only to decision makers but 
uncertainties related to risk reducing measures must be communicated to barrier management, 
designers and operators. 
NORSOK Z013 standard focuses on clear communication and consulting through all clauses of its 
requirements. The objective of communication is also defined as a continuous process throughout 
the risk assessment, not only limited to establishing the finished risk picture. Clause 5.6 states that 
the intention of establishing the risk picture is to provide information, not only to the relevant 
decision makers, but also the users. The information shall be clear and balanced and contain the 
main risk contributing factors and also include a discussion about uncertainty. Limitations and the 
difference opinions based on expert knowledge should be highlighted in such a way that the risk 
picture is suitable for decision making and understandable to all relevant personnel.  
Another clear requirement for the risk picture is that all assumptions and presuppositions shall be 
clearly and explicitly documented and categorized as analytical, technical or 
organizational/operational. The analytical part represents the methods used in the QRA and the 
knowledge is based on. The technical part we can relate to the previous mentioned barrier 
management and design. The organizational/operational part relates to the organizing of activities 
and the operational phase. The details of these assumptions and presuppositions shall be described 
in a manner that is understandable to the end user of the information.  
The presentation of the risk picture shall include a ranking of risk contributors as well as the 
identification of risk reducing measures and present important operational assumptions in order to 
control risk.  
In chapter two we focused on the sensitivity of assumptions, this is also very well covered in clause 
5.6 and states that a sensitivity analysis shall be carried out to include identification of the most 
important assumptions/parameters in the analysis. This is in line with the theory about sensitivity 
presented in chapter two. Another important aspect of the sensitivity analysis requirements is to 
evaluate the effects of changes in the assumptions/parameters. This represents the belief in 
deviation dimension as covered in chapter two. 
 
3.4 Risk analysis/assessment and risk management 
Risk analysis is a part of risk management, and knowing and considering what the information is 
going to be used for in a later stage is imperative for the effectiveness or robustness of the risk 
assessment. Not just in a safety setting, but also in cost effectiveness and value setting. Therefore the 
uncertainties must be communicated in such a way that the next link in the project chain can 
concentrate on the important information and reduce the efforts on finding it as well as reducing the 
reducing the recourses on not so important information. This way the risk assessors should not 
expect the decision makers to find or automatically focus on the important, but see it as their task to 
communicate it.  
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Consider that the risk analyst does the QRA, the risk manager and/or the project manager makes the 
decisions based on the information they receive. These decisions again affect the design that the 
engineer makes and again this affects how the operator is able to operate the design. The risk analyst 
is in this case the provider or producer of information, the managers the receivers and the engineer 
and/or the operator is the end users. This chain cannot be completely regarded as separate links and 
exclusive processes where everyone is operating individually, they have some overlapping interests. 
For example if the risk analyst makes an assumption, in a concept selection phase of a project, about 
a parameter 𝜆 in his model, the output will only be valid as long as the assumption is valid. The 
concept is selected based on the model output by the managers. How true this assumption is in the 
future, can be affected by how the engineer makes the design in the detail design phase or how the 
operator uses the design in the operating phase. If a wrong assumption is made in the beginning of a 
project, the mistake will propagate through the project phases if not uncovered. The biggest 
problems with detecting and correcting a mistake in later phases is that 
 The mistake becomes more difficult to detect in later phases, because the amount of 
information generated grows rapidly 
 The later a mistake is corrected the more costly it will be to correct 
To have wrong assumptions propagating through the project phases not only adds to the cost but 
decreases the safety if not corrected. 
In Figure 7 we show that the decision makers does not need to know all the details of the QRA, but 
there are certain details that they really need to focus on and that is the job of the assessors, as 
information provider, to highlight and communicate. Otherwise the decision makers would need the 
same competence, as the assessors, to efficiently deduct this information. As mentioned the decision 
makers also have other information they must consider. This important information is highlighted 
with a green overlap between the QRA and management.  
The same is for the design engineers that get their guidelines from the decision makers. The better 
the designers are able to make their design according to the framework, and make their decisions on 
the lowest level possible where the competence is better, the more value they can add to the 
project. Therefore it is also important that the design engineers have a good knowledge about the 
reasons the framework is as it is, and not just knowing the frames. The framework has some of its 
base in the QRA and the important information contained is shown as green. This information is due 
to many technical assumptions made in the QRA. There are also many operational and organizational 
assumptions made in a QRA, not always stated thus becoming a presupposition. These also affects 
the operators in an operating phase and the focus area is shown as green between QRA and 
operators. 
We have added barrier management to this illustration. This is because PSA ask for better barrier 
management in offshore oil and gas projects. (PSA, 2015c) Barrier management affects the design, 
operations and organization and the decisions made through the project. There can be many 
assumptions made, technical, organizational and operational, in a QRA and barrier management 
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involves all. Effective and good barrier management is based on good information and knowledge, of 
which a QRA should be a provider for. 
 
 
Figure 7: QRA interface with other processes in offshore project 
As mentioned, barriers are put in place to reduce the probability of an unwanted event, causation 
barriers 𝐵𝑐 or to reduce the consequences, mitigating barriers 𝐵𝑚. Uncertainties, 𝑈(𝐵𝑐|𝐾) and 
𝑈(𝐵𝑚|𝐾), about these barriers in the QRA must be highlighted. These are often very sensitive to the 
result otherwise the barriers would not be needed. PSA separates between technical, operational 
and organizational barriers. (PSA, 2015d) The difference between them can be illustrated by the 
following example. 
Imagine an unwanted event occurs and a stop button must be pushed in order to stop the process. In 
this case the stop button is a technical barrier element, the person pushing the stop button is an 
organizational barrier element and the task of pushing it is an operational barrier element. The task 
of pushing it will be defined in a specified procedure to handle the unwanted event, so that the 
procedure with its specified content will be the barrier element in itself. Failure in one of these 
elements prevents the barrier function of stopping the process. The quality of the barrier elements 
also affects the performance of the barrier function. The technical quality of the stop button, the 
quality (competence) of the operator and the quality of the procedure (how well does the task 
reflect the purpose). 
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A QRA does not necessarily makes statements about such factors, thus instead of being an 
assumption, they are presuppositions or presumptions. Not being stated does not remove the fact 
that they are equally important, and with sensitivity of barriers, they can be even more important 
than some of the assumptions made. 
A technical barrier element is often referred to as a SCE (Safety Critical Element). If it fails, the system 
will fail and we can have an unwanted event. SCEs are designed to a minimum PS (Performance 
Standard) that states how the element should perform in order to perform its barrier function. A PS 
also defines how the verification of such performance should be done to make sure that it is 
according to requirements. Verifications are often done at many stages such as design, procurement, 
installation and commissioning. The information has its base in the QRA and such information must 
be communicated in a way that it is transparent and easy to find and focus on. This information is 
often found in the technical assumptions made in a QRA. 
Organizational and operational barrier elements are not under the same strict supervision as 
technical barrier elements. But with 40% to 50% of the leaks on NCS in the years 2001 to 2004 and 
between 55% and 83% in the years 2005 to 2011 according to PSA (PSA, 2014) and RNNP (Risk level 
in the petroleum activity) being due to  operational and/or organizational factors and not technical, 
the real improvement for achieving the zero philosophy should be focusing on organizational and 
operating barriers in the same way as technical. This thesis will not cover more about how this can be 
done through such things as competence requirements or procedure development, but the start of 
such a process will be that the QRA communicates the uncertainties about such barriers as equally 
important as technical barriers as input to the organizational decisions and the operating personnel. 
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4 Using the new risk perspective in QRA 
4.1  Introduction 
The latest revision of NORSOK Z013 standard came in 2010. Due to that and the relatively long 
process of going from concept selection to operating oil production, it is very difficult to use an 
example that is actually made according to these requirements. The platforms that have a QRA 
according to newest revision are still in planning or in detail engineering/construction. Another 
problem of using such a QRA from the offshore is that the level of detail in them can be spread over 
hundreds of pages and it would be too extensive to analyze it all. This problem is not only valid for 
performing this thesis, but also for the end users within the organization or project and highlights the 
need to focus the information communicated to relevant parties. 
To address the theories and requirements, a smaller project was necessary to show the essence of 
this thesis. The points made can however be scaled up to larger QRA in efforts to focus the 
information and communicate uncertainties. 
Another point to note is that this case study is not based on a QRA performed to the requirements in 
NORSOK Z013 standard. There are different requirements to onshore based installations but this 
thesis will not cover these requirements. This case is however relevant to the theory of 
communicating uncertainties as the onshore plants deals with hydrocarbons and the assumptions 
made can be easily transferred to an offshore facility. 
The case is based around an onshore LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) plant situated near a residential 
area. There is a rather large main QRA produced for the facility, but this case will concentrate on a 
QRA performed for a single operation of bunkering a ship that uses the LNG for propulsion fuel. 
The objective of the performed QRA was to calculate the risk, taking into consideration the fueling 
operation. The risk calculated was in the form of individual risk and individual specific risk to onsite 
manning, 1st and 2nd party, and for off-site population, 3rd party. 
This thesis will not cover all assumptions and points made in the QRA, only those necessary to make 
the point and reflect on the information provided. It is not the intention of this case study to make a 
risk assessment or evaluate the performed assessment, but to evaluate how the information in the 
QRA is communicated to the relevant parties. 
 
4.2  The case 
To bunker a ship with LNG from the plant, two trucks was planned to drive to the ship and use the 
truck onboard pumps to bunker the ship through flexible hoses. This is a temporary solution while 
building a permanent solution where pipes would go directly from the plant to the ship. This 
operation can potentially add to the overall risk as it adds complexity to the already situated plant. 
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The risk to on- and offsite personnel is due to potential leaks and ignition of LNG. In other words the 
initiating event I studied is a LNG leak. The causes to such a leak will be a rupture in the technical 
containment barriers such as the hoses. The probability of a leak is based on the historical leak 
frequency of such hoses and the severity of the leak is determined by the leak size and time. Leak 
size is determined by the leak frequency of small, medium and full rupture and the historical data 
that supports such. The three evaluated leak sizes are input parameters to the model. They do not 
vary and these are not possible to control as they are represent a potential future event and the 
uncertainty to which size an actual leak will have is represented by using the three different sizes. 
The leak frequency is also an input parameter to the model and the uncertainty about this parameter 
is represented by their frequency probability and is well documented by a qualitative assessment in 
the QRA and a good description of why it is chosen as representative. 
The leak time is determined by an industry standard and QRA had recommended a leak time of 90 
seconds where 60 seconds are detection and initiation time and 30 seconds is reaction time. This 
leak time has been chosen to represent the risk picture and is dependent on many controllable 
factors in such a way that the leak time should be regarded as a input variable to the model. 
This case study will focus on the model input variable leak time. As a variable is controllable, its 
information and uncertainties represents the identification of risk reducing measures in the form of 
mitigating barriers. To reduce the possibility of a leak to occur, something would have to be done 
with the input parameter leak frequency. If that was to be done, if the frequency was not acceptable, 
the hose design would have to be changed to a more robust design. 
Since the assumptions and uncertainties are well documented, it is possible to deduct these and use 
the information, but if this was a larger installation such as an offshore oil producing platform the 
total amount of information can make it more likely to not be picked up by the relevant party. 
The QRA contains an assumption register and they are well documented. The assumption made for 
detection and isolation time of 90 seconds, contain many underlying assumptions. The main 
assumption of 90 seconds is also evaluated with regards to sensitivity. The problem however is that 
the underlying assumptions that lead to the assumption of 90 seconds are not separately evaluated 
with regards to sensitivity and their potential impact on the result stays somewhat hidden. 
In this case study we will look at these underlying assumptions and evaluate them according to 
strength of knowledge, belief in deviation and sensitivity. 
 
4.3  Assumptions 
The main assumption of 90 seconds is based on an industry standard for similar systems. This tells us 
that for this to hold true, the systems technical, operational and organizational factors should be a 
minimum of average quality as represented by the industry standard. It would be very difficult to 
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verify this unless there is sufficient data from an operational period that verify that practice is 
according to standard. 
As mentioned, the main assumption is based on a series of underlying assumptions that are written 
in text. We will focus on two of them as the rest of the text can been seen in coherence with these 
two. 
1) Procedures have been made and relevant training to handle leakages has been carried out 
2) Gas detection on the trucks will shut down bunkering during a leak 
In this case, we evaluate the dimensions of uncertainties as if we evaluated them when performing 
the QRA in an early phase or concept selection, as NORSOK Z013 standard would refer to it for an 
offshore facility. As this QRA was created before the later project phases, we have no updates in 
detail engineering or operation to evaluate, but we will make an example when evaluating the 
robustness. 
 
4.3.1 Assumption 1 – Procedures and training 
This could easily been seen as two different assumptions one about procedures and one about 
training. There is a third sentence in the QRA that also relates to this that assumes the manual ESD 
(Emergency Shut-Down) button is activated upon detection. This assumption contains implications 
on organizational, operational and technical barrier elements as illustrated by the example in section 
3.4.  Since these three sentences together perform a barrier function, that if one of them fails, the 
barrier function will fail, we will treat them together. This is because they will have the same 
sensitivity on the leakage time. 
The procedure relates to the task of pushing the ESD button as an operational barrier element. The 
quality of this operational barrier is determined by the quality of the procedure. The training relates 
to the organizational barrier element which is the person performing the task. The quality of this 
barrier element is determined by the quality of the training this person receives. There could also be 
other risk influencing factors for this organizational barrier element such as time pressure, being 
overworked and stress. Such factors and their implications are covered by the BORA project (Aven, 
Sklet, & Vinnem, Barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release)Barrier 
and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release): Part I. Method description, 
2006), but without proper data in this case study, we choose not to make any assumptions and 
disregard them. The quality of the technical barrier element is determined by the technical quality of 
the button and is referred to as PFD (Probability of Failure on Demand). This technical quality and 
minimum requirements must be communicated to the project engineers through technical 
specifications to hold true. In this case, we will assume this is done and that the button is working 
according to specifications.  
As the definition of sensitivity is with regards to the outcome of a risk assessment, i.e. if the barrier 
changes a little bit, how will that affect the RM? In real life, there will be more than one single barrier 
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to prevent an unwanted event or to mitigate the consequences. If this is taken into modelling the 
end result might not change because the other barriers still prevent a change in outcome, leading to 
the conclusions that it is not sensitive. Uncertainties with regards to barriers could be viewed a little 
different than the definition of sensitivity described by Flage and Aven (Flage & Aven, 2009), as the 
barriers are in place with a minimum requirement for a specific reason as a risk reducing measure. 
The definition by Flage and Aven (Flage & Aven, 2009) is with regards to the change of input to a 
model, but barriers are not, or rarely, included in models for a QRA per today. If a barrier is not to 
minimum requirement, it could be regarded as sensitive in the purpose of communicating 
uncertainties since risk managers cannot accept one being below minimum standard. 
Strength of Knowledge 
Strength of knowledge on this assumption we will classify as moderate as the assumption is seen as 
very reasonable that proper procedures will be made and training carried out. This assumption is 
made before such is performed and no evidence is presented, therefore the assumption should not 
be considered with a strong knowledge. 
Sensitivity 
Sensitivity can be consider as significant as these are related to the performance of a barrier function 
that is consequence mitigating and we don’t have the model tools to assess the actual sensitivity 
with regards to the risk metric. Without this function working, the leak time can be much larger than 
the assumption, and the leak time is sensitive to the risk metric as mentioned in the QRA. It is a 
relative small change in the base case, a little bit weaker procedure or weak training, can result in 
altered conditions. This is of course purely hypothetical in this thesis, as we do not have the 
resources to check the actual sensitivity. 
Belief in Deviation 
Belief in deviation we set to low. This is a qualitative judgment based on the fact that the information 
on the implications of these factors, are properly communicated and there are no obvious reasons 
why procedures and training should not be performed. 
With a moderate SoK, high sensitivity and low belief in deviation, this assumption is put into setting 4 
according to (Berner & Flage, 2014). 
 
4.3.2 Assumption 2 – Gas detection on trucks 
The bunkering will be done by the trucks on-board pumps through a manifold and further through a 
flexible hose connected to the ships LNG tank inlet. If a leak occurs, the trucks pumps must be 
stopped either by previous mentioned manual stop button or that the trucks gas detectors 
automatically shuts down the operation. This way this automatic shut-down is a second line barrier 
for the same function. In other words, the assumption of 90 seconds leak time depends on a 
minimum of either manual or automatic shut-down. Since the manual and automatic shut-down 
performs independently of each other we will treat the automatic shutdown as a separate 
assumption. 
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Strength of Knowledge 
Strength of knowledge we regard as strong since the assumption made is seen as very reasonable. As 
this is an automatic system, it has little human influence and much reliable data are available on such 
technical system and the technical part is well understood. 
Sensitivity 
The sensitivity we will still consider as high since this is also a barrier function and if it fails, the leak 
time can be much different from the assumption, this is the same reasoning as in assumption 1. 
Belief in Deviation 
Belief in deviation we set to moderate/strong because the gas detectors are located on the trucks 
and for them to be able to detect a gas leak the cloud has to reach the trucks. That means that the 
further away from the trucks the leak occurs, the more difficult it will be for the detectors to detect. 
The strong knowledge, high sensitivity and moderate belief in deviation put this assumption in a 
setting 5 according to (Berner & Flage, 2014). 
 
4.4  Robustness of the QRA 
With a setting 4 and 5 on the assumptions, as shown in Table 3, we don’t regard the QRA as robust. 
Of course the QRA contains many more assumptions that would have a low setting and the total view 
could be an overall robust QRA. Since the scope of this case study is not to perform a full evaluation 
of the QRA with regards to the total, but focusing on the communication of uncertainties, we will 
only consider these two factors and base the robustness only on these two. 
If we consider this QRA with low robustness performed in a concept selection phase, i.e. before the 
equivalent of detail engineering and operation phase, it will be natural to have uncertainties with 
settings 4 and 5 and a low robustness. Then these high settings can be communicated to all relevant 
personnel into the next phase, not only the decision makers, in order to improve the robustness and 
potentially improve safety. 
When the equivalent of detail engineering is performed, which would be the phase where 
procedures are written and technical details are finalized, these assumptions could be updated with 
new knowledge and receive an even lower setting, making the QRA more robust.  It is important to 
note that with new and stronger knowledge, the settings can become lower, but the new knowledge 
can also reveal that the risk is higher than previously assessed. As mentioned in section 2.8.3, 
reducing uncertainty doesn’t necessarily mean reducing risk. But with stronger knowledge, and if the 
risk is increased, the result is still more robust. 
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Table 3: Assessed settings for assumptions 1 and 2 in early phase 
Belief in deviation 
from assumption 
Sensitivity of risk 
index wtr to 
assumption 
Strength of Knowledge 
  
  Strong Moderate / 
Weak 
Low Low     
  
Moderate / High   Assumption 1 
(Setting 4) 
Moderate / High Low     
  Moderate / High Assumption 2 
(Setting 5) 
  
 
Let’s say that in a in a middle phase, or detail engineering phase, more detail knowledge is available 
and leads to the new uncertainty assessment of the assumptions: 
 For assumption 1 the procedures are made and a training plan with content has been made, 
leading to an increase to strong knowledge, still a low belief in deviation and the sensitivity is 
still unchanged. 
 For assumption 2, the knowledge is still strong and the sensitivity unchanged. The belief in 
deviation is reduced to low because detail engineering has revealed that the trucks detectors 
will not register a leak on the ship side quick enough. Therefore they decide to put remote 
detectors on the ship side that connects to the trucks ESD system. 
Due to these two updates in the assumptions, assumption 1 and 2 is now a setting 3 as shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Assessed settings for assumptions 1 and 2 in middle phase 
Belief in deviation 
from assumption 
Sensitivity of risk 
index wtr to 
assumption 
Strength of Knowledge 
  
  Strong Moderate / 
Weak 
Low Low     
  
Moderate / High Ass. 1 and 2  
(Setting 3) 
  
Moderate / High Low     
  Moderate / High     
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When entering the operational phase, where bunkering is performed, operational data of barrier 
performance could be used to further update the robustness of the QRA. Not necessarily in a positive 
way, but a negative way would still have the positive effect of indicating where recourses are needed 
to improve safety.  
For example in assumption 1, the belief in deviation was in early and middle project phases set to 
low. Let’s imagine a late phase or operational phase, where internal unwanted events reported that 
the training performed and the content did not properly reflect the needed competence. The setting 
could be updated to a moderate belief in deviation based on this new knowledge, changing 
assumption 1 from a setting 3 to a setting 5. This would be shown in a negative way of the 
robustness of the QRA, and it would be a more transparent need to put resources on the case to 
bring it back down to a setting 3. 
If we look at the robustness of the QRA quantitatively as described in chapter 2, we would have the 
results shown as in Figure 8. We see the early phase skewed to the right and the middle phase 
moved to the middle. Ideally we would have further reduction in settings so that the late phase 
update would show a left skew, but in our example we adjusted the settings of assumption 1 with 
knowledge from operational phase to a setting 5, decreasing the robustness with a small right skew. 
 
Figure 8: Quantified robustness of the QRA in early, middle and late phases. 
Another positive effect that shows in these result, if uncertainties about barriers are considered 
having a moderate or high sensitivity, they will never get a lower setting than setting 3. This way, 
they will not disappear in the number of assumptions with low settings, not even when all 
uncertainties are reduced to ideally minimum. This way they will not lose their priority in operational 
phases and barrier management is an important life cycle continuous process. 
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4.5 An incident occurs 
There was an incident at this particular plant where a leak occurred during bunkering. The flexible 
hose had been transferred to the ship side for connection with a crane. During the bunkering the 
hose stayed fixed in the crane and the ship started leaning to one side. This ship movement caused 
the strain on the hose to become too high and the hose broke away from its connection on the ship 
side. LNG started leaking and came out the ship side through drip trays. The leakage is detected by 
the ships onboard cameras surveying the bunkering and shutdown of the bunkering happens 
manually. The incident did not lead to injuries to personnel or material damages. 
The incident investigation shows that the automatic ESD did not function according to requirements. 
It is not clear if the ESD systems onshore- and ship-side were connected, but since the pumps were 
on the truck sides and the QRA states that the gas detectors on the trucks will shut down the pumps, 
we will assume they were not connected. As this leak occurred on the ship side, the furthest away 
from the trucks detectors, it would be very difficult for the trucks detectors to function as the 
assumption dictated. 
The investigation also found no documented training of the personnel performing the bunkering 
operation. It is stated that those performing the operation is of significant importance for the safe 
execution. Without this documented training, the assumption made in the QRA is not fulfilled. 
The failure of the two important barrier functions lead to the time from first detection, probably by 
camera, to shutdown of operation was a total of 2 minutes and 18 seconds. The time from the leak 
occurred until the detection is not clear, so the total leak time is more than the 2 minutes and 18 
seconds. This is a large deviation from the assumption of 90 seconds, due to failure in the underlying 
assumptions of gas detection and shut-down by either automatic or manual action. 
It is not the scope of this thesis to theorize why these assumptions where not followed up on. The 
uncertainties were properly communicated, and their importance well stated in the summaries in the 
QRA. Like previously mentioned, this was a relatively small QRA designed to clarify the potential 
change in the overall risk based on a single operation. The operation had a relatively small and simple 
technical design with clear boundaries. This makes the information about the uncertainties easy to 
find and communicate. There was no requirement to update the QRA in later project phases as we 
have done theoretically in this case. 
If this was a large production installation in the North Sea, the QRA would contain a large number of 
initiating events and an event such as a process leak can be evaluated several times for different 
areas and the total report could span over a four digit number of pages. This would make these 
critical assumptions difficult to find and the assumptions made in this case could have easily been 
made for an offshore facility. 
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5 Discussion 
5.1  Risk perspective and risk description 
We have reviewed the difference between the traditional risk perspective 𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑃) and a new risk 
perspective 𝑅 = (𝐶, 𝑈) where 𝑅 is risk, 𝐶 is consequence, 𝑃 is probability and 𝑈 is uncertainty. The 
difference between them can at first glance seem to be only the probability and uncertainty, but as 
we have seen, a probability can have epistemic uncertainties based on the knowledge used to derive 
the probability, but the probability alone does not communicate this. When we regard probability as 
only a tool to measure uncertainty, as described in section 2.2, we need more tools to express the 
uncertainties in a transparent way to decision makers and rest of the project organization that will 
need and use this information.  
The probability approach can, in many ways, be a good way of describing risk. It is easily relatable 
and visually easy to communicate. Changes in risk can easily be quantified by probability and put into 
other calculations, such as a cost-benefit analysis, to verify that the cost is reasonable or not 
according to the expected gain. But the probability is based on a set of conditions that are not 
necessarily directly communicated by the probability alone. These conditions can represent 
uncertainties as well, in the form of assumptions, presumptions or presuppositions. The traditional 
way of communicating these uncertainties, is through the risk analysis or assessment report where 
these are written in text and/or represented by a list. These reports can be quite extensive, and even 
if they did cover all uncertainties, a good amount of resources and experience may be needed to 
keep track of all the details. Another downside of only having the uncertainties, expressed in text or 
as a list, is that it can be difficult for another person in a later phase to know exactly what the 
assessor was thinking or knowing at the time, as the level of detail and quality in writing depends 
heavily on the skill of the assessor and the interpretation depends heavily on the reader. 
The new risk description focuses on background knowledge as what everything else is based on. In 
written text, the necessary background knowledge of one assessor is very difficult to transfer to 
another assessor or to the decision maker. If one assessor makes one assumption based on his or 
hers background knowledge, another assessor may make the assumption, or assess the importance 
of that assumption, different with different background knowledge. To ensure that the people draw 
the same conclusions, they would maybe need to have the same background knowledge or at least 
use extensive resources to communicate that information.  
With a new risk perspective focusing on uncertainties, they are more easily communicated as the 
important information that the interested parties should focus on.  
 
5.2  NORSOK Requirements 
NORSOK Z013 standard still contains the old definition of risk, even though PSA has updated their 
risk definition in line with the theories presented in chapter two. Despite this fact, the intentions, 
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purpose and requirements for risk assessment within the standard still reflects on many of the key 
parts of the new risk perspective.  
NORSOK Z013 standard and ISO/IEC 31000 both focus on continuous communication and consulting 
one side and continuous monitor and review on the other side, through the whole risk assessment 
process. This process includes establishing the context, hazard identification, risk analysis and 
evaluation. 
To communicate and consult, the information must be easy to understand in order to be as effective 
as possible. To monitor and review, the information must be concentrated in order to put the right 
resources on the right task at the right time. It can be a challenge to both concentrate the 
information and at the same time make it as understandable as possible.  
The risk assessment process is then required to be done through all phases of an offshore project. 
The level of information grows rapidly in an offshore project, so will the complexity of that 
information. Another thing is that the number of relevant personnel that have an interest in the 
information also grows as the project moves forward. These facts support that is it can be 
increasingly difficult to keep focus on the right issues, at the right time to the right personnel as Z013 
requires. 
 
5.3  Assumptions and level of details 
Uncertainties can be represented by an assumption, presumption or a presupposition as described in 
section 2.7. We have explained the difference between them but as and assumption and 
presumption are stated, a presupposition can be more difficult as it is not stated. To detect a 
presupposition, the reader must identify this based on their own competence. Failure to do so can 
lead to the presupposition to go untreated through the project. An assumption or presumption 
should also be divided down to the lowest practical level to uncover all necessary underlying 
assumptions that can represent a critical uncertainty.  
When investigators do their investigations after an incident, they don’t settle for the top level reason 
on why an incident occurs. They really go down to the most detailed level until they reveal the chain 
of events, including all the organizational, operational and technical issues that had arrived. In the 
same way, a QRA should not focus only on the top level uncertainties, but also put the efforts into 
the underlying assumptions in order to understand and manage risk. 
As we saw in the case study, the assumption of 90 second reaction time was made based on another 
set of conditions that were important in order to make sure the assumption was correct. Each of 
these two underlying assumptions needed their own focus in order to maintain the risk picture. Since 
these underlying assumptions were written in text in a register of assumptions, this example also 
illustrated the difference in how it can be focused when communicated differently. 
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There are other examples from incidents on NCS where underlying assumptions has caused an 
incident to occur and where, under slightly different circumstances, lives could be lost.  
One such example is the Big Orang XVIII ship colliding into the 2/4-W platform on the Ekofisk field om 
the morning of June 8th 2009. (PSA, 2009) On this morning the ship was entering the 500 meter 
safety zone around the platforms to carry out planned well-intervention work. During entering the 
ships autopilot was not deactivated according to the pre-entry checklist, causing the ship not to react 
to the captain’s commands.  
In this case we see that the risk has been identified and mitigating barriers, such as the pre-entry 
checklist has been created. We don’t have access to the risk assessment for this scenario, but it is 
reasonable to think that this high potential accident was regarded as very unlikely due to the facts 
that the risk reducing measures were put in place. The investigation shows that the operator had not 
sufficiently followed the requirement to survey all activity in the safety zone. They had also not 
sufficiently made sure of the ship’s compliance to safe entry of the safety zone. The reasons for this 
is stated in the investigation report (PSA, 2009) that the procedures did not specify such a scenario 
completely enough and that the maritime competence were not adequate. These findings could 
point the same underlying assumptions as in our LNG case, where the assumption could have been 
stated as “Procedures have been made and personnel have the relevant competence to handle ship 
emergency within safety zone”. 
Another example is the hydrocarbon leak on the ULA P production installation on September 12th 
2012. (PSA, 2013) The direct cause for the leak was that the bolts that held the valve together broke 
due to chlorine induced corrosion. The bolt material was AISI 316 stainless steel which is sensitive to 
temperatures above 60deg Celsius. The process medium was 120deg Celsius.  
There was previously found seeping on the valve and a risk assessment was done to see if the valve 
needed changing immediately or if it could wait until the next planned process shutdown the year 
after. The conclusion was that the valve could wait until the year after, but mitigating measures was 
put in place such as 2 week inspection and it was registered in a “seep register” for follow up. The 
operator’s technical authority on material was not involved in this risk assessment. The valve was 
produced to a previous material specification, a newer specification requiring the bolt material to be 
25% Cr superduplex had been implemented. The problem of chlorine induced corrosion was 
identified in the overall risk assessment. 
In this case, the operator had a very good knowledge of the problematics, but the correct 
competence on material quality was not included in the risk assessment and they failed to identify 
the risk of this happening. It is a little unclear why, but it is reasonable to think that they thought the 
valve would be according to the material requirement of having superduplex. A reasonable 
assumption could have been “Valve is according to latest specifications and is not sensitive to 
chlorine induced corrosion”.  
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In both the Big Orange XIII case and the Ula P case, we see that the personnel had a strong 
knowledge about the risk, so why did they still go wrong? We theorize that there are three main 
reasons why this happens: 
1. There is lack of knowledge, i.e. the uncertainty is high 
2. There are motives to not follow up on the uncertainties 
3. The uncertainties and their sensitivity is not properly communicated 
In all cases, the LNG, Big Orange XVIII and the Ula platform, the knowledge could be considered 
medium or strong, all the information was there and the threats were identified. It could be 
considered medium in the cases where not the expert where involved. However the barriers failed, 
this supports the thought that uncertainties about barriers should always be considered sensitive to 
the risk. If somehow an uncertainty about a barrier is not found sensitive, it is reasonable to think 
that the barrier is in reality not so efficient and maybe the effect other barriers could be investigated 
and implemented instead.  
We do not believe anyone has the motivation to ignore threats and knowingly put themselves, 
others or assets at risk. 
This leaves only the communication of these uncertainties to the right personnel at the right time. It 
is reasonable to believe that classifying uncertainties by what they are about, barriers, models, 
variables, parameters or output and grading them to the settings 1 to 6, will help the right personnel 
to identify them and take the right actions at the right time to prevent accidents to occur. The right 
time can be in any phase of a project, and the earlier the actions are made, the better effect they can 
have on the overall risk, cost and added value to an offshore project. 
 
5.4  Classifying uncertainties 
To classify the uncertainties with regards to the model, variable, parameter, barriers or the outputs 
can be useful in order to identify who, or which relevant parties, that have interest in those 
uncertainties. The interested parties can then more easily find the uncertainties. It is a little obvious 
that the risk managers and those who deal with the barriers are interested in the uncertainties 
regarding these barriers. What is not so obvious is who is interested in the other classes. 
The uncertainties regarding the model would maybe be of most interest to the risk assessors as they 
describe the possibilities and limitations of their model, but these possibilities and limitations can 
also be of interest to the decision makers as a more detailed and maybe correct model would cost 
more and need more recourses. For the design engineers, barrier management or operating 
personnel the details of how the model performs would maybe be of less interest. It is thinkable that 
they would be more interested in the difference in output from the same model between one 
assessment and another where they have updated their inputs with new knowledge of detail design. 
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The variable and parameter uncertainty would maybe be of more interest to the design engineers, 
barrier management and operating personnel, as they describe the possibilities of and limitations of 
their design and organization. We differentiated between variable and parameter because a 
parameter that is uncontrollable, such as significan wave height, can only be mitigated through 
stronger design. An example of this is the structural design of a platform that should be able to 
withstand a one hundred year wave, a wave so large that it statistically would only appear once 
every hundred years. Another example of such parameter uncertainty is operating procedures for 
cranes, or MOB (Man over board) boats. The weather, which is uncontrollable, makes restrictions on 
operating these types of equipment, because of phenomena such as wind speed and wave height.  
The variable uncertainty goes into the category of what the project can control. An example of which 
is pressure reduction and/or pressure control. If a leak scenario is assessed and the uncertainty with 
regards to the leak size is due to a fluctuating pressure, this can be mitigated by either stronger pipe 
design or, since it is controllable, the process designers can use pressure reduction or pressure 
controlling valves to mitigate. We can still argue that these are two of the same, mitigating by design, 
but a parameter can only be mitigated by a stronger design, while a variable gives many more 
options. Because of the wider range of possibilities to mitigate the variable uncertainty, separating 
these and focusing on them can give the right resources the right time to come up with smarter and 
less costly solutions. 
 
5.5 Robustness 
In the progress of work on this thesis we have been unable to evaluate actual QRAs performed for 
offshore installations on NCS and because of that we have no data to support or deny how 
evaluations of a QRA’s robustness have been, or if they have been, performed in the past. NORSOK 
Z013 standard has clear requirements to do a sensitivity analysis of the results. This can serve as an 
indicator of robustness. Another thinkable indicator can be the level of detailed information in the 
QRA itself. The level of detail in a QRA also has clear requirements in NORSOK Z013 standard to be 
adapted to the level of detail available in the project.  
There can be a downside to using only the sensitivity or the level of detail information as an indicator 
for overall robustness as it says nothing about the uncertainty, or in other words, the strength of 
knowledge about the risk influencing factors. The uncertainties would be expressed in text, within 
the report and the reader would have to deduct the quality of this information instead of getting it 
communicated in a more transparent way. In chapter two, we said that the sensitivity depends on 
the knowledge and so does the belief in deviation. Together the SoK, sensitivity and belief in 
deviation gives us the three dimensions in the form of the settings. These settings can give the reader 
a possibility to understand the quality of the background knowledge and the importance of the 
assumptions without knowing all the exact details. 
We have not been able to find out if robustness have previously been quantified as described in 
chapter two and shown in chapter 4. With the possibility of quantifying the robustness, an overall 
monitoring and review of the QRA could potentially be done more efficiently. It is a requirement to 
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update the QRA when modifications are done, and without the settings the cost of this may be 
reduced. 
Say an existing offshore installation in an operating phase has a modification project, and they must 
update the QRA. The solution could be to send the entire QRA to a vendor performing such updates, 
together with the modification details. They would then assess the new risk picture with regards to 
those modifications, and maybe the result would not change. If however, a modification is to be 
done, and the operator can see themselves, that the modification only affects conditions or 
assumptions with a low setting, and that the modification itself does not change those settings, they 
could potentially justify that the robustness and thus the results will not change in order to not 
update the whole QRA. Which assumptions that could potentially be affected by a modification could 
also be more easily identified if they were categorized.  
If the settings represent the level of uncertainty through the three dimensions, and uncertainty is 
regarded as the main component of risk, maybe the number of assumptions for each setting could be 
regarded as a risk metric themselves. This could be an interesting affair and bring the focus on 
updating and reviewing the QRA into another level of information as less recourse could be needed 
to perform such a task. 
There can be a downside to such a scenario where the robustness through the settings are regarded 
or used as a risk metric. The downside being that it can be misused to justify savings, when in reality 
there is a real need to update the risk picture.  
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6 Conclusions 
 
A QRA for an offshore facility on NCS can contain a large volume of information about uncertainties. 
This information is vital for the whole project organization, not only the decision makers. In order to 
produce a risk picture including the uncertainties, that represents the conditions the risk is based on, 
the uncertainties most be better communicated in a transparent way.  
The effort a relevant person must put in to interpreting the results in a QRA should be reduced and a 
QRA should focus that information. 
Describing the uncertainties by what they are about, the model, a barrier or design, will give the 
reader an understanding of which uncertainties are important to them and their role in the project.  
Classifying the uncertainties by their degree of knowledge, sensitivity and belief in deviation will give 
a reader a quick understanding of the importance of those uncertainties and a tool to prioritize. This 
understanding by the relevant person can then happen without the reader needing to have the same 
or equal background knowledge as the writer. 
This reduction in effort and simpler, more transparent way of communicating uncertainties can 
potentially reduce overall cost, increase safety and thus add value to an offshore project.  
It is important to note, that for this effect to happen, the level of detail the uncertainties represent 
must be as low as possible so that the underlying assumptions also get highlighted and not only the 
top assumptions. 
If the level of detail is low enough, it is thinkable that this will require more recourses than normal in 
an early or middle phase of a project, but it is also thinkable that the potential extra cost of that will 
be less in a late design phase or operational phase as the information will be there and changes 
easier to handle with less efforts.  
We have, through the examples of the LNG plant, Big Orange XVIII and Ula platform, those 
uncertainties with high sensitivity, but still a strong knowledge can still produce an accident. It would 
be interesting if further research on past accidents could reveal a picture about strength of 
knowledge and sensitivity and if they have a correlation with the number or type of unwanted 
events.  
We have also clarified that uncertainty is about the knowledge, with strong knowledge we have little 
uncertainty and vice versa. But knowledge can be compromised by motivation. If a preference for 
one solution exists, that motivation can prevent the assessor to use that knowledge correctly and 
this can happen unintentionally.  Motivation is very difficult to understand and research, but maybe 
in the future, knowledge with regards to uncertainties could be replaced by competence where 
competence motivation is included. 
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